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email: valentina.tarkovska@dit.ie

Abstract
This study examines a relationship between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – the fraction of the top
five executive directors’ total compensation that is captured by CEO - and firm value in the
UK. CPS reflects the relative importance of CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is
able to extract rents. CPS may also alter effectiveness of board performance by influencing
cooperation and cohesiveness among its members. Using a large sample of UK-listed
companies over the 1997 to 2010 period, we document evidence supporting a negative
relationship between CPS and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Our results are
consistent with the hypothesis that high CPS is associated with agency problems, and is likely
to impact negatively on the executive team’s spirit and motivation. Our results have major
implications for the on-going debate on how to reform executive remuneration, and highlight
the importance of considering remuneration issues at the board level, supporting the
principles of UK Corporate Governance Code (2010).

JEL classification: G32, G35, G38, J33, L29
Key words: executive compensation, CEO compensation, corporate governance, agency
problem, firm performance.

1. Introduction
Corporate scandals about ‘fat cats' compensation packages in Britain[1] are a timely reminder
that pay-performance problem in the UK requires further attention. Shortcomings in
regulation of compensation-related issues have been addressed by the UK Corporate
Governance Code 2010 (The Code), with the particular attention being paid to the importance
of

establishing

definite

connections

between

director’s

remuneration

and

firm

performance[2]. In September 2013, the UK Government also introduced a mandatory “say
on pay” legislation allowing firm's shareholders to vote on the remuneration of executives.
In this study, we aim to shed additional light on the link between executives’
compensation and a firm performance in the UK context. In particular, we investigate
whether pay inequality between CEO and top executives affects performance of British
companies. We hypothesize that fraction of aggregate compensation of top-five managers
captured by the CEO personally (the CPS) impacts board effectiveness, which in turn affects
firm outcomes. In our analysis, we controls for several corporate governance characteristics
(board composition, board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure, and board busyness) and for
various firm characteristics (company age, company size, ratio of capital expenditures to total
assets, and leverage). We use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London
Stock Exchange, comprising 1,401 firms and 6,959 firm-year observations over the 1997 to
2010 time period. Our empirical methodology includes estimation of panel data by using
various fixed effects models.

i.

ii.

See The Guardian: “David Cameron to curb 'fat cat' pay with people power”`, 7 th January, 2012,
available at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/07/david-cameron-fat-cat-pay. "We've got
to deal with the merry-go-round where there are too many cases of remuneration committee members
sitting on each other's boards, patting each other's backs and handing out each other's pay rises," he
said. "We need to redefine the word 'fair'. We need to try to give people a sense that we have a vision at
the end of this, of a fairer, better economy, a fairer, better society, where if you work hard and do the
right thing you get rewarded”
Section D: Remuneration. Main Principle: “levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract,
retain, and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company
should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive
directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual
performance.” (The UK Corporate Governance Code, June 2010: p.22).

2

We find consistent support for the proposition that higher CPS is associated with lower
firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Our results rule out the optimal contracting hypothesis,
which suggests that high CPS is determined deliberately by a company as the motivation
incentive (to motivate CEO as well as top executive directors) with the view to improve firm
outcomes. However, the results strongly support the agency perspective, suggesting that high
CPS level could be due to the agency problem in firm with powerful and influential CEO. In
addition, high CPS could demotivate those managers nearest to the CEO, destroy team
cooperation within the board room, and lead to poor board and thus firm performance (via the
social comparison effect, inherent to British boards[3]). Our results indicate that CPS can
provide a useful tool for research on firm performance, and that its relation with the value of
firms is an important issue to be considered in the UK context.
Our study relates to different bodies of literature. First, there is clear evidence from
the literature that proportion of compensation received by CEO has been trending up over
time (see Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005; Frydman and Saks, 2010; Forbes et
al., 2014 among others). We add to this stream by investigating the relationship between CPS
and firm performance in the UK context. Second, we extend the literature analysing the
association between different corporate governance characteristics and Tobin’s Q (see
Yermack, 1996; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009
among others). We contribute to this literature by considering another aspect of governance
arrangements, the CPS, and its impact on firm performance. Finally, our work enhances the
literature that analyses different CEO qualities and characteristics and their effects on firm
outcomes. We highlight CPS as an important feature, which can provide additional insights
into understanding of CEO compensation – firm performance link.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. We provide a theoretical background

iii.

See Zalewska (2014a,b) for detailed discussion of the UK board mechanisms and structures.
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and develop our hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 contains the sample description and
summary statistics. Section 4 outlines the methodology used for the analysis. Section 5
examines the relationship between CPS and firm value. Section 6 concludes.

2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Remuneration Disparity and Firm Performance
Academic literature suggests that pay difference within top management has important
consequences for functional efficiency of the management team and, subsequently, on firm
performance (see Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007; Lee et al.,
2008; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Fridman and Saks, 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2011; Zalewska,
2014a; Forbes et al, 2014 among others). Even though researchers confirm existence of the
relationship between pay inequality and firm performance, there is a disagreement regarding
the nature of this relationship. Lazer and Roshen (1981), Rosen (1986), Eriksson (1999),
Henderson and Fredrickson (2001), DeVaro (2006a, 2006b), Lee et al. (2008), Kale et al.
(2009), Rankin and Sayre (2011) find that pay disparity has a positive effect on company
performance. On the other side, Hayward and Hambrick (1997), Bloom and Michel (2002),
Carpenter and Sanders (2002), Siegel and Hambrick (2005), Fredrickson et al. (2010),
Bebchuk et al. (2011), Zalewska (2014a), report that a wide remuneration gap among
executives affects firm outcomes in a negative way.
Despite the growing body of literature on executives’ remuneration disparity, there are
only a handful of studies examining its effect on firm performance using UK data. Correa and
Lel (2014) investigate the effect of “say on pay” law on executive compensation, CPS and
firm value using a large cross-country sample from 39 countries including the UK. They find
that CEO pay – firm performance links become stronger when “say on pay” laws are
implemented, and that companies that previously had greater CPS, experience significant
performance improvements. These findings imply a negative correlation between CPS and
4

firm outcomes, and are consistent with results from previous research (e.g., Bebchuk et al.,
2011). Zalewska (2014a) analyses the link between remuneration dispersion at executive
board level and firm performance using a large sample of British companies. She also unveils
a negative relationship between remuneration dispersion and performance. Forbes et al.
(2014) criticise CPS as a valuable measure to be used in the analyses of pay disparity –
corporate performance relationship, and introduces a Gini coefficient as an alternative.

2.2. Optimal Contracting
Under the optimal contracting theory, CEO compensation is determined by a complex set of
factors and reflects CEO talent, ability, experience, and career concerns. Optimal
compensation reflects the extent to which companies are willing to offer ‘tournament’
incentives to top executives other than a CEO. Optimal contracting arguments (See Edmans
and Gabaix, 2011 for review) suggest that high CEO pay - relative to pay of other top
executives - is determined deliberately by companies as motivation incentive with the view to
improve firm outcomes. In a typical rank order tournament framework, the best performer is
promoted to the next level in the managerial hierarchy. The promotion guarantees a higher
pay level, so the framework motivates executive directors to exert greater efforts and perform
better. Earlier empirical research on labour economics (e.g., Bognanno, 2001), and the most
recent research on corporate finance (e.g., Kale et al. , 2009) use the compensation gap
between CEO and lower-rung executives as a measure of tournament incentives. Lee et al.
(2008) and Kale et al. (2009), among others, find tournament incentives to be an important
mechanism in motivating managers.
Based on the above, we hypothesize that companies intentionally decide to set high CPSs
to motivate their CEOs and top executives other than CEOs. CEO is motivated to be a good
steward and make every effort to ensure successful company performance, because he/she
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takes care about his/her own reputation (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992); in turn, top executives,
other than CEO, are also motivated to perform better while competing for the CEO position.
This leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: CPS is positively associated with firm value.

2.3. Social Comparison Perspective
In contrast to the optimal contracting theory, there is a very strong opposing view on the
effects that high remuneration disparity has on a firm value. Fong et al. (2010) argue that
compensation should reflect a manager’s ability, but at the same time should not lay the
foundation for strong feelings of inequality/injustice among peers on the labour market.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) demonstrate that tournament mechanisms within the executive
team can produce negative incentives for top executives other than CEO. It is very unlikely
that a company will benefit from the tournament framework if top executives who are
competing for the CEO position refuse to cooperate and even might undermine their rivals. A
wide gap between CEO compensation and compensation of top executives (the “prize size”)
emphasises on the importance of the CEO as a “dominant player” (Bebchuk et al., 2011).
Bebchuk et al. (2011) argues that it is beneficial to have a dominant player as he/she can
guarantee clarity, steadiness and cost reduction of decision making process. On the other side,
a large body of literature, starting with Shaw (1932), suggests that group decision making is
superior to the individual decision making. Moreover, the dominant player approach can lead
to resentment on the part of other members of the top executive team (Brill, 1993; Cook,
1990). Hicks (1963) introduced the notion that large pay differences may have a negative
impact on employees through feelings of inequity and it may lead to a weaker employees’
dedication increasing a dysfunctional conflict, which, in turn, “diminish the efficiency of the
team” (Hicks, 1963: p. 334). Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1988)
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and Levine (1991) build up on the earlier work of Hicks (1963) and argue that low pay
differences may have positive effect on employees’ diligence and productiveness by creating
well-balanced and efficient labour relations leading thereby to better outputs. Levine (1991)
also demonstrates that lower level of pay dispersion leads into better employee cohesiveness
and productivity[4]. Considering that UK boards are not strongly hierarchical and CEOs are
not so powerful in Britain compared to their American colleagues (see Tom and Wright,
2005; Aguilera et al., 2006), high CPS can impact negatively on team spirit and motivation,
weakening board effectiveness. In accordance with the social comparison view[5], this can
attenuate firm performance.
High level of CPS also can be viewed as a sign of significant agency problems. CPS can
indicate the extent to which a CEO uses his/her power and influence to serve his/her own
interests (Bebchuk et al., 2011), captures a board and set up his/her own pay (Bebchuk and
Fried, 2004). Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CEO pay slice (CPS) negatively affects firm
performance, especially in firms with entrenched managers.
Based on the above, we argue that CEO may be able to entrench, maximise his/her own
power, and extract rents by securing higher than optimal compensation, regardless of his/her
quality of service. A high CPS level may result in lower cohesion and less cooperation among
board members, which negatively affects firm performance. This leads us to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: CPS is negatively associated with firm value.

3. Sample Selection and Data Description
3.1. Sample Selection
iv.
v.

This argument is also consistent with research on cooperation in general economic situation (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1988; Lazear, 1989; van den Assem et al., 2012).
The social comparison theory was introduced by Festinger (1957), and underlines equity theory
oriented concerns (Adams, 1965).
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For this study, we use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange. We obtain firms’ financial and market information from Thompson Datastream,
and corporate governance and directors’ compensation information from BoardEx. The
sample period is from 1997 to 2010, and it includes all firms whose information is available
from these two sources. The choice of year 1997 as the start year for our sample window is
due to the limited availability of corporate governance data prior to this year.
We merged the data from BoardEx and Thomson Datastream and ended up with
unbalanced panel of 1,401 firms and 6,959 observations over the 1997 – 2010 time period.
Our definition of CPS is marginally different from definition in Bebchuk et al. (2011).
British corporate boards are, on average smaller than American boards. Only 16% of our
sample companies have five or more executive directors at the board level. We compute CPS
as the fraction of the total compensation paid to a group of minimum two and maximum five
top executives, that is received by the CEO. We use Tobin’s Q as a key measure of corporate
performance.

We control for other potential determinants of firm value, found to be

important in the previous studies (see Bebchuk et al., 2011; McNulty et.al., 2013; Zalewska,
2014a; Forbes et al., 2014) and include firm size, company age, capital expenditures, and
leverage in our model. We also collect information about the governance structure of each
firm, such as board size, board composition, board busyness, CEO tenure, CEO duality,
whether the CEO is insider or outsider, i.e. was/was not an employee of the firm before
his/her appointment to the CEO position, and information on the compensation of executive
directors other than CEO. All variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Tables 2 and 3
give sample calculation examples for Board Busyness and CPS respectively.
*****Insert Tables 1, 2 & 3 here*****

3.2. Data description and summary statistics
8

We report summary statistics in Table 4[6]. We separate data into variables describing firm
performance (Panel A); compensation, director characteristics and board structure (Panel B);
and other firm characteristics (Panel C). The average CEO pay slice (CPS) based on the total
compensation of up to top five executives including CEO is 45.22%, with minimum 0 and
maximum 100%. The boards in our sample have on average 7 directors with minimum 3
directors and maximum 14 directors. The average proportion of executive directors at the
board level (Board Composition) is 48.44% with minimum of 13.51% and maximum 80% of
executives at the board. The average CEO tenure is 4.44 years in our sample companies, with
minimum 0 and maximum 24.70 years. 57.81% of companies in our sample have CEOs, who
were not employees of the company before (Outside CEO).
Firm size is, on average 4.35. The leverage level is 17.70% in the average company,
with maximum leverage standing at 95%, and minimum leverage equals to 0%. Company age
is, on average, 13.78 years, with the oldest company being in existence for 45 years, and the
youngest company in our sample being just 0.34 years old. The maximum (minimum) ratio of
capital expenditures to total assets is 0.34 (0), with the average being 0.05. The average
Tobin’s Q is 2.55, with maximum (minimum) Q equals to 20 (1.50).

*******Insert Table 4 here *******

Table 5 reports CPS descriptive statistics. The statistics are presented for each year
separately, along with statistics for two sub-samples, before and after year 2002[7]. On
average, CPS has been growing over the 1997-2010 period. This is consistent with the
evidence from the literature that proportion of compensation received by CEO has been on an
upwards trend over time (see Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005; Frydman and
vi.
vii.

All variables are winzorized to the 1st/99th percentiles.
In 2002, the UK was the forerunner in mandating that shareholders be allowed a non-binding, or
advisory vote on executives’ pay (“say on pay”).
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Saks, 2010). Introduction of advisory “say on pay” law in 2002 has not changed this
increasing trend. In particular, mean CPS has been increasing gradually, from 32% in the
year 1997 to 50% in year 2010, with an average CPS around 40% before the introduction of
“say on pay”, i.e. before 2002, and average CPS around 47% upon implementation of this
law, i.e. from year 2003 onwards. This is in agreement with results in Ferri and Maber
(2013) who find that introduction of “say on pay” has a limited effect on the levels of CEO
compensation.
*****Insert Table 5 here *****

4. Methodology
In this section, we examine the effect of CPS on company performance. We follow the
literature that relates firm performance to various corporate governance characteristics and
use Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance (see Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Gompers et al., 2003). The CPS definition
is adopted from Bebchuk et al. (2011) with a minor modification, which was necessary due
to the difference in board sizes in the UK and US[8].
We include control variables that have been considered important in the previous
literature (see Bebchuk et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2013; Zalewska, 2014a). We include
Board Composition, which is a proportion of executive directors at the board level.
Considering the nature of data available and difficulties with identifying independent
directors, we use Board Composition measure as a proxy for board independence (a lower
proportion of executive directors at the board level is associated with higher level of board
independence). Previous academic research finds board independence important in designing
viii.

See Section 3.1 for the definition of CPS.
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a CEO compensation plan (see Mehran, 1995; Ozerturk, 2005). We also control for board
size and include natural logarithm of a total number of directors at the board level (Board
Size). Academics provide controversial evidence on the relation between board size and
company performance, with some documenting positive (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Dalton et
al., 1998; Jackling and Johl, 2009), while others reporting negative association (Yermack,
1996; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). In addition, we control for board busyness and
include Busy Board variable, defined as a proportion of busy directors (directors with three or
more directorships) at the board level. Core et al., (1999), and Shivdasani and Yermack
(1999) suggest that directors can become overcommitted when serving on multiple boards,
rendering them unable to provide meaningful managerial monitoring. Fich and Shivdasani
(2006), Jiraporn et al. (2006), and Jiraporn et al. (2008) argue that boards with busy directors
are associated with lax corporate governance and lower firm value. We also include a
variable indicating that CEO and Chairman is the same person (Duality). We consider CEO
Tenure as explanatory variable in our models. Bebchuk et al. (2011) suggest that CEO tenure
impacts on firm performance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that CEO propensity to
employ more allies to the board will increase with his/her tenure, thereby increasing the CEO
bargaining power. In line with Bebchuk et al. (2011), and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) we
also consider a CEO outsider variable. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) document that CEOoutsider receives higher compensation resulting in higher level of CPS, which could be an
indication of his/her unique skills and not necessarily agency problems.
It is important to recognise that CPS could be endogenously determined, i.e. affected
by the factors that are also affect firm performance. To account for this, we use fixed effects
models, which consider how changes in CPS are associated with changes in firm value
(Model 1)
̃
̃
̃
̃
̃
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
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̃
̃
̃
̃
𝛽5 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 +
̃ 𝑖𝑡 + + ∑13
̃ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦_𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑
𝛽9 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑗=2 𝛽𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(1)

where the ~ (tilde) defines demeaned variables, and Performanceit is our performance
measure, i.e. Tobin’s Q. All other variable definitions are in Table 1.
We ran fixed effects models with robust standard errors and robust standard errors
clustered by industry. We also use fixed effect models with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard
errors, which are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. We
also use industry-adjusted CPS in each firm’s industry at the same FTAG3 level in the same
year. In addition, we examine whether our results are robust to alternative specification of
CPS based on the total compensation of a maximum of three (rather than five) executive
directors (CPS 3 directors).

5. Results
5.1. Univariate analysis
Table 6 presents univariate comparison of key descriptive variables by CPS quartiles. Firms
with high CPS appear to differ significantly from those with low CPS. Tobin’s Q declines as
CPS increases. It declines in the second and third quartiles (as predicted by the agency and
social comparison arguments) and then increases in the fourth quartile again. The firms with
highest CPS are smaller than those with the lowest CPS. Firms in the first quartile of CPS are
younger than the firms in the fourth quartile. The univariate relation between CPS and Capex
is not monotonic. Firms in the first three CPS quartiles have similar Capex, but firms in the
fourth quartile have lower Capex. Leverage increases from the first to the fourth quartile of
CPS. Firms with highest CPS have the busiest boards. Board size declines monotonically
from the first to the fourth quartile of CPS. Board composition changes in line with the board
size and declining monotonically from the first to the fourth quartile, which is consistent with
12

the view that CEO can entrench himself/herself, extract rents and increase agency costs, if
board is less independent. Proportion of ‘outside’ CEOs increases gradually from the first to
the fourth quartile suggesting that such directors are more valuable assets for companies.

********Insert Table 6 here*******

5.2. Multivariate analysis
In this section we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between
CPS and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. The regression results are reported in Table 7.
We separately report estimation results using fixed effects models with White (Panel A),
robust clustered by industry (Panel B), and Driscoll–Kraay (1988) (Panel C) standard errors
correction methods. Our main model is Model 1, with Tobin’s Q being regressed against CPS
and our selected firm and governance control variables. We find that CPS coefficients are
negative and significant (at the 1% level in Panel A and Panel B, and at the 10% in Panel C).
In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation change in CPS is associated with a
reduction in Tobin’s Q by 11.91%.
We consider industry-adjusted CPS[9] (Model 2) and CPS computed using total
compensation of maximum three executive directors (Model 3). The results remain robust to
these alternative specifications with negative and statistically significant CPS coefficients.
These results are consistent with the view that high CPS adversely affects firm performance,
supporting social comparison argument and Hypothesis 2. Our results are in line with results
reported in the literature starting with Hicks (1963), who introduced the notion that large pay
disparity may have a negative impact on employees through feeling of inequality and leads to
a weaker dedication, diminishing efficiency of a team. Our results are in agreement with

ix.

The industry adjustment is made by subtracting industry mean CPS (at the same FTAG3 level) from
firm CPS in the same year
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findings in Bebchuk et al. (2011), Correa and Lel (2014), and Zalewska (2014a), who argue
that a wide remuneration gap among executives affects firm outcomes in a negative way.
Throughout our analysis we were not able to find support for the optimal selection argument
(Hypothesis 1). Considering that UK boards are not strongly hierarchical (see Zalewska,
2014a, 2014b), our results suggest that “tournament incentives” are ineffective in British
companies.
Examining control variables in the regressions, we find some interesting results. One
of our corporate governance characteristics, Board size, has coefficients that are negative and
statistically significant (at the 1% level), supporting the view that small boards are more
efficient and perform better than their large counterparts when it comes to managing
company performance. Both company size and capital expenditure coefficients are positive
and statistically significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that bigger companies and those with
higher capital expenditure levels perform better. We also find positive relationship between
leverage and Tobin’s Q. These findings are in line with findings in previous literature (see
Bebchuk et al , 2011; McNulty et al., 2013; Zalewska, 2014a).

********Insert Table 7 here*******

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how CPS, the proportion of maximum top-five executive
directors’ aggregate compensation captured by CEO, affects firm performance. We offer new
insights into the pay inequality - performance relationship by evaluating three different
arguments that are prevalent in the finance and management literature. One view claims that
high CPS level distinguishes a company’s CEO and helps to create a good competition spirit
within the board room resulting in better corporate performance. However, two other views
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suggest exactly opposite: high CPS can be an indicator of agency problems in a company in
which a powerful CEO extracts unjustified rents (agency argument), and could harm board
effectiveness by impairing team cohesiveness and motivation (social comparison argument),
in either case resulting in poor corporate performance
Our analysis reveals a negative association between CPS and corporate performance
measured by Tobin’s Q. This evidence supports both the agency and social comparison
arguments. The results of our study are robust for controlling for various firm, board and
CEO characteristics. Our results are also robust to the different specifications of CPS. Our
findings are in line with Bebchuk et al. (2011) and Correa and Lel (2014). However, this is
the one of the first studies that we are aware of, which investigates the CPS – performance
relationship using the broad sample of UK-based companies[10]. We find that results from
the UK sample are similar to those from studies on US companies. However, the underlying
reason for the negative relationship between CPS and firm performance could differ between
the UK and US contexts. Considering the specificity of UK corporate boards (see Zalewska,
2014a,b), it is natural to put forward the social comparison argument as an important reason
for the negative associations between CPS and firm performance[11].
Given the changes in remuneration practices introduced by the UK Corporate
Governance Code (2010) and the “say on pay” legislation (2013), we argue that CPS is an
important aspect of firm governance and management that deserves attention of researchers
and policy makers. The fact that high CPS negatively impacts on firm performance has strong
implications for the on-going debate on how to reform executive remuneration so that it

x.
xi.

Forbes, Pogue and Hodgkinson (2014) use smaller sample of companies, considering firms from the
UK FTSE 100 index in their study of CPS-performance relationship.
UK companies are generally characterised by high corporate governance standards, but agency
problems may still exist in some companies. However, considering the attention the business
community has given to the issue, and the recommendations provided by the most recent UK
Corporate Governance Code (2010), it is natural to assume that agency conflicts would be minimal,
and that the social comparison argument is more likely to explain the negative CPS – performance
relationship.
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provides the right incentives. It highlights the importance of considering remuneration issues
at the board rather than at the CEO or at the sectoral or industry levels, and supports the UK
Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles[12]. UK corporate governance reforms move
towards increasing board’s responsibilities for company’s performance, and it is important to
consider board-wide remuneration issues without narrowing them down simply to the details
of CEO compensation.

xii.

“The performance-related elements of executive remuneration… should be sensitive to pay and
employment conditions elsewhere in the group” (Supporting principle, Section D: Remuneration, The
UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010: p. 22).
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Table 1
Variable Definitions
The data variables refer to the corresponding compensation and corporate governance variable identifiers in the
BoardEx annual database and to the corresponding performance and firm characteristics variables identifiers in
the Tomson Datastream database.
Variable
Definition
Compensation
CEO pay slice (CPS)

The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum top-two and
maximum top-five executives, including CEO that is received by the CEO.

CEO pay slice (CPS),
3 directors

The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum top-two and
maximum top-three executives, including CEO that is received by the CEO.

5
Corporate Governance
Board busyness

The proportion of busy directors at the board level. Busy directors are defined
as directors holding three or more directorships, including the “home”
company, in the public companies at the same time.

Board composition

The proportion of executive directors on the board. Total number of
supervisory directors divided by the total number of all directors on the board.

Board size

The natural logarithm of the total number of all directors on the board.

CEO tenure

The number of years directors have served on the board

Duality

Indicator variable: equals one if CEO and Chairman is the same person

CEO outsider

CEO Outsider is a dummy equal to one, if CEO was working at the firm for
less than one year before becoming CEO.

Performance measure
Tobin’s Q

(Book value of assets – book value of common equity – balance sheet differed
taxes + market value of equity)/book value of total assets: (WC02999–
WC03501 – WC03263 + MV)/ WC02999

F5irm characteristics
Size

Natural logarithm of market value: Ln (MV)

Leverage

Total debt/total assets WC03255/ WC02999

Capital expenditures

Capital expenditures/ total assets: WC04601/ WC02999

Company age

Number of years since company’s information is available on Thomson
Datastream: BDATE
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Table 2
Calculation of CPS variables
This is an example calculation for our measures of CEO pay slice (CPS) using BoardEx database data for the
AEGIS GROUP PLC (ISIN GB00B4JV1B90) for the year 1997. Total compensation is a total compensation
including salary, bonuses, and equity-based compensation per executive director. The Rank is an executives’
rank by total compensation. The proportion of CEO compensation to the total compensation of total five
executives including CEO (CPS) is the total compensation of CEO to the sum of total compensations of top five
executives..
Director
Rank
Total Compensation
Sir Crispin Henry Davis (CEO)

1

971

Kai Hiemstra

2

793

Eryck Rebbouh

3

483

Bruno Kemoun

4

476

Colin Richard Day

5

432

Raymond (Ray) F Kelly

6

341

3,155

Total Compensation of top five executives

971

Tot5al CEO Compensation
CPS

971/3,155=0.3078

Table 3
Calculation of Board Busyness variables
This is an example calculation for our measures of director busyness using BoardEx database data for the
SAFEWAY PLC (ISIN GB0000492412) for the year 1997. Total number of directorships counts the number of
directorships (total number of current quoted boards including the “home” company) held by all directors
serving on the board. Directorships per director are estimated as the total number of directorships held by the
directors of the board divided by board size. The proportion of busy directors (Board Busyness) is the number of
directors holding three or more board seats divided by board size.
Director
Total Directorships
Colin Deverell Smith

1

David Gordon Webster

3

Gordon Wotherspoon

1

Patricia (Pat) Anne O'Driscoll

1

Robert George Charters

1

Simon Timothy Laffin

1

Sir Alistair Grant

4

Doctor Neville Clifford Bain

4

Jul5ia Ann Burdus

4

Michael John Allen

2

Total Directorships

22

Directorships per Director

22/10 = 2.2

Proportion with three or more directorships

4/10 = 0.4 (40%)
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Table 4
Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 7660 firm-year observations for years from 1997 to
2010, excluding financial firms. All variables are winzorized to the 1st /99th percentiles. All variable
d5efinitions are in the Table 1.
Mean
Minimum Maximum Observations
Panel A: Performance Measure
Tobin’s Q

2.55

0.00

20.00

7649

CPS
Board composition

0.45
0.48

0.00
0.20

1.00
0.80

7028
7649

Board busyness

0.17

0.00

0.67

7649

Board size

1.90

1.10

2.64

7649

Board duality

0.09

0.00

1.00

7649

CEO tenure

4.44

0.00

24.40

7649

CEO outsider

0.58

0.00

1.00

7649

4.36
13.78

-0.22
0.34

9.83
45.03

7576
7579

Capex/Total Assets

0.05

0.00

0.34

7631

Leverage

0.18

0.00

0.95

7648

Panel B: Compensation/Director/Board characteristics

Panel C: Firm characteristics
Size
Company Age
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics on CEO pay slice (CPS) compensation
This table presents descriptive statistics (mean, median, maximum and minimum CPS for our sample firms over the period 1997-2010.

CPS Descriptive Statistics
YEAR

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Before SoP
(1997
-2002)

Mean

0.32

0.36

0.38

0.40

0.40

0.42

0.43

0.44

0.45

0.46

0.48

0.48

0.48

0.50

0.40

0.47

Median

0.31

0.34

0.36

0.37

0.37

0.39

0.41

0.42

0.43

0.44

0.47

0.47

0.50

0.50

0.37

0.46

Maximum

0.87

0.87

0.93

0.95

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Minimum

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

37

50

230

351

440

494

560

641

733

819

769

674

612

618

1602

5426

Observations
Difference of CPS means
(before and after SoP)

After SoP
(2003
-2010)

t-stat
(p-val)

12.03
(0.00)
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Table 6
Firm characteristics by CPS quartiles
This table presents univariate comparison of means and medians of measures of corporate governance and firm
characteristics of 7649 firm years from the 1997-2010 sample of UK-based publicly traded firms, excluding
financial firms. The director and board data is from the BoardEx database, firm data is from Tomson
Datastream. CEO pay slice (CPS) is the fraction of total compensation to the group of minimum top-two and
maximum top-five executive directors including CEO that is received by CEO. Other variables definitions are in
the Table 1. The table displays the means and medians (in parentheses) of various director, board, and firm
characteristics for first, second, third, and fourth quartiles of CPS. The t-statistics is for a difference of means
test from the first to the forth quartile of CPS. Each quartile contains approximately 1780 firm -years. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

First
quartile

CPS characteristics
CPS range

0.00 to 0.0.32

Second
quartile

0.32 to 0.44

Third
quartile

0.44 to 0.0.58

Fourth
quartile

t-statistic
(p-value)

0.58 to 1.00

CPS

0.22
(0.25)

0.37
(0.37)

0.50
(0.50)

0.70
(0.65)

127.94***
(0.000)

CPS, 3 directors

0.22
(0.30)

0.42
(0.43)

0.52
(0.52)

0.70
(0.66)

104.64***
(0.000)

2.55
(1.51)

2.49
(1.50)

2.41
(1.47)

2.47
(1.50)

-0.72***
(0.469)

0.15
(0.13)

0.16
(0.14)

0.18
(0.17)

0.19
(0.17)

7.48***
(0.000)

Board composition

0.56
(0.57)

0.51
(0.50)

0.45
(0.43)

0.39
(0.40)

-41.00***
(0.075)

Board size

8.00
(8.00)

7.62
(7.00)

6.69
(6.00)

6.25
(6.00)

-23.67***
(0.000)

Duality

0.12
(0.00)

0.09
(0.00)

0.07
(0.00)

0.06
(0.00)

-6.39***
(0.000)

CEO tenure

4.44
(2.90)

4.94
(3.30)

4.58
(2.90)

3.91
(2.80)

-3.43***
(0.001)

CEO outsider

0.49
(0.00)

0.52
(1.00)

0.59
(1.00)

0.65
(1.00)

8.74***
(0.000)

4.60
(4.50)

4.83
(4.76)

4.33
(4.14)

4.28
(4.13)

-4.04***
(0.000)

Company age

13.75
(8.69)

14.36
(9.82)

14.27
(9.46)

14.87
(8.65)

2.41**
(0.016)

Capex

0.05
(0.03)
0.17
(0.13)

0.05
(0.03)
0.18
(0.14)

0.05
(0.03)
0.18
(0.14)

0.04
(0.03)
0.18
(0.13)

-5.11***
(0.000)
1.62
(0.1063)

Performance
Tobin’s Q

Director/board
characteristics
Board busyness

Firm characteristics
Size

Leverage

Table 7
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) and Firm Performance
This table reports results from an analysis of corporate performance measured by Tobin’s Q in our sample of firms from 1997 to 2010.
Panel A shows the regression results obtained by using fixed effects models with year dummy variables (not shown) and t-statistic based on
White’s standard errors. Panel B shows the regression results obtained by using fixed effects models with year dummy variables (not
shown) and t-statistics based on the robust standard errors clustered by industry (we use FTAG3 index as an industry identifier). Panel C
shows the regression results obtained by using fixed effects models with t-statistics based on Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. CPS is the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of maximum top five executives’ total
compensation and is expressed as decimals. CPS 3 directors is the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of maximum top three
executives’ total compensation and is expressed as decimals. CPS adjusted is industry-adjusted CPS. The industry adjustment is made by
subtracting industry mean CPS (at the same FTAG3 level) from firm CPS in the same year. All other variable definitions are in Appendix 1.
Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.

Panel A: Fixed effects model with White’s corrected standard errors
Model 1
Model 2

CEO Pay Slice (CPS)

-0.6182***
(0.2052)

CPS adjusted

-0.6533***
(0.2043)

CPS, 3 directors
Board busyness
Board composition
Board size
Duality
CEO tenure
CEO outsider
Size
Company age
Capex
Leverage
Constant
Year dummy
R2
Number of observations

Model 3

-0.4887
(0.2758)
-0.0740
(0.3934)
-1.6531***
(0.1879)
-0.1126
(0.1603)
-0.0102
(0.0098)
0.1036
(0.0928)
1.0090***
(0.0422)
-0.1729
(0.3178)
2.3249***
(0.6901)
1.6539***
(0.2558)
3.4210
(2.0519)
Yes
0.16
6959

-0.4890
(0.2758)
-0.0816
(0.3914)
-1.6562***
(0.1871)
-0.1131
(0.1603)
-0.0103
(0.0098)
0.1032
(0.0928)
1.0090***
(0.0422)
-0.1647
(0.3178)
1.3160***
(0.6901)
1.1655***
(0.2526)
3.4210
(2.0048)
Yes
0.16
6959

-0.5308***
(0.1780)
-0.5139
(0.2770)
-0.0601
(0.3826)
-1.5946***
(0.1839)
-0.1168
(0.1613)
-0.0090
(0.0010)
0.0923
(0.0933)
1.0200***
(0.0424)
-0.2059
(0.3187)
2.4900***
(0.6922)
1.7047***
(0.2565)
3.3691
(2.0319)
Yes
0.16
6959
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Table 7 (cont)
Panel B: Fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered by industry FTAG3 code
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

CEO Pay Slice (CPS)

-0.6182***
(0.2161)

CPS adjusted

-0.6533***
(0.2043)

CPS, 3 directors
Board busyness
Board composition
Board size
Duality
CEO tenure
CEO outsider
Size
Company age
Capex
Leverage
Constant
Year dummy
R2
Number of observations

-0.4887
(0.4485)
-0.0740
(0.4060)
-1.6531***
(0.3478)
-0.1126
(0.2364)
-0.0102
(0.0116)
0.1036
(0.1305)
1.0090***
(0.1361)
-0.1729
(0.2990)
2.3249
(1.4852)
1.6539*
(0.8179)
3.4210
(2.0048)
Yes
0.16
6959

-0.4890
(0.24472)
-0.0103
(0.0116)
-1.6562***
(0.3522)

-0.5308***
(0.1783)
-0.5139
(0.4523)
-0.0601
(0.3997)
-1.5946***
(0.3427)

-0.1131
(0.2371)
-0.0103
(0.0116)
0.1032
(0.1307)
1.0090***
(0.1363)
-0.1647
(0.2942)
2.3160
(1.4854)
1.6582*
(0.8164)
3.1849
(1.9676)
Yes
0.16
6959

-0.1168
(0.2359)
-0.0090
(0.0117)
0.0923
(0.1260)
1.0200***
(0.1352)
-0.2059
(0.3083)
2.4900
(1.4715)
1.7047*
(0.8095)
3.3691
(2.0701)
Yes
0.16
6959
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Table 7 (cont)
Panel C: Fixed effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
Model 1

CEO Pay Slice (CPS)

Model 2

-0.6244*
(0.3204)

CPS adjusted

-0.6703*
(0.3211)

CPS, 3 directors
Board busyness
Board composition
Board size
Duality
CEO tenure
CEO outsider
Size
Company age
Capex
Leverage
Constant
Year dummy
R2
Number of observations

Model 3

-0.5411
(0.4922)
-0.0929
(0.3481)
-1.7414***
(0.2964)
-0.1250
(0.1808)
-0.0058
(0.0049)
0.1042
(0.0800)
1.0508***
(0.1421)
-0.1341
(0.0244)
2.2312***
(0.7026)
1.5692***
(0.3487)
2.8560
(0.8542)
No
0.15
6959

-0.5411
(0.4932)
-0.1071
(0.3414)
-1.7458***
(0.2952)
-0.1261
(0.1808)
-0.0059
(0.0049)
0.1036
(0.0800)
1.0497***
(0.1422)
-0.1427
(0.0263)
2.2229***
(0.6984)
1.5725***
(0.3478)
2.7248
(0.7756)
No
0.15
6959

-0.5939**
(0.2634)
-0.5615
(0.5055)
-0.0163
(0.3044)
-1.6928***
(0.2853)
-0.1303
(0.1768)
-0.0045
(0.0047)
0.0923
(0.0776)
1.0606***
(0.1410)
-0.1355
(0.0244)
2.3976***
(0.7371)
1.6175***
(0.3349)
2.6701
(0.7773)
No
0.15
6959
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